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JOINT TORTFEASORS: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN
THE RULES REGARDING RELEASES AND
CONTRIBUTION
By JAMES F. THAXTERt
The California legislature has laid to rest two well-known common law
rules regarding joint tortfeasors. Title 11 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, enacted during the 1957 session, provides generally that a right
of contribution exists among unintentional joint tortfeasors against whom
a joint judgment has been rendered,' and that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not release the others.' The common law rules will first be discussed separately, and then an attempt will be made to evaluate the new
statute and foretell its effects.

The No-Contribution Rule
Contribution may be loosely defined as the sharing of a common liability, which, in the situation under consideration, is a tort liability. The rule
t Member, Second-Year Class.
1 CAL.CODE CIV. PROC. § 875:
"(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants
in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution among them as hereinafter provided.
"(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the principles of
equity.
"(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. It shall
be limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share of the person so paying and in no event
shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the
entire judgment.
"(d) There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person.
"(f) This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law, and where one
tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another there shall be no right of
contribution among them.
"(g) This title shall not impair the right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judgment in full as
against any tortfeasor judgment debtor."
§ 876:
"(a) The pro rata share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them.
"(b) Where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of one of them or of
another, as in the case of the liability of a master for the tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which there may be indemnity between them."
§ 880:
"This title shall become effective as to causes of action accruing on or after January 1,
1958."
2
CA. CODa CIV. PRoc. § 877:
"Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to
enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number
of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort"(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so
provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the
release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; ..."
[ 180 ]
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that there is no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors dates back
at least as far as 1799 and the oft-cited English case of Merryweather v.
Nixan3 This was a case apparently involving intentional wrongdoers. Lord
Kenyon ruled that an action for contribution could not lie upon an implied
assumpsit in such a case. He gave no reasons for this decision, but subsequent commentators have felt that the reluctance of courts to adjudicate
matters between two guilty parties was the controlling consideration. There
is a great deal of difference, however, between cases where the parties have
joined together, in concert of action, to cause injury and cases where they
have inflicted injury unintentionally, although jointly.
There appears to be no good reason why a court should not be willing
to settle matters between unintentional joint tortfeasors. Unfortunately,
though, the courts, at least the American courts,4 have relied on Merryweather v. Nixan and have applied its rule indiscriminately in cases involving joint tortfeasors. Thus, it has long been recognized in the United States
that the general rule is that no right of contribution exists among tortfeasors, whether they have inflicted injury intentionally or unintentionally. Of
this rule, Dean Prosser says:
"There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone ... 5
The question seldom has been raised in California, but on each occasion
when it has been presented the California courts have held uniformly that
there is no right of contribution among tortfeasors-intentional or unintentional.6
The "obvious lack of sense and justice" in the rule denying contribution among unintentional tortfeasors has led to a movement away from the
rule, particularly in the last 25 years. Many states have statutes changing
the rule, and in some jurisdictions the result has been reached by the courts,
without the aid of a statute.7 California, through the adoption of the aforementioned act, has now joined this movement. By 1955 approximately half
the states had allowed contribution among joint tortfeasors in some form or
another.' There was no uniformity of rules among the states allowing contribution, however, so the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni3 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
4 For the developments in England see PROSSER, TORTS 247 (2d ed. 1955).
5Id. at 248.
6Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist., 1 Cal. 2d 331, 334, 34 P.2d 994, 996
(1934) ; Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712-13, 195 Pac. 389-90 (1921); Dow v. Sunset
Tel. and Tel. Co., 162 Cal. 136, 138, 121 Pac. 379, 380 (1912); Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry.,
149 Cal. 569, 573, 87 Pac. 24, 26 (1906); Jennings v. Day, 7 Cal. App. 2d 555, 557, 46 P.2d 193,

194 (1935).
7HANDwoO

216-17 (1955).
8Ibid.

OF THE NATIONAL CONFERMNCE OF COs=iSSIONERS ON UNiFOR
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form State Laws promulgated a revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.' The first uniform act was recommended by the commissioners
in 1939,"0 but it had little effect in producing uniformity. These acts are
discussed later.
The Release Rule
The rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all has had a
longer, and more troublesome existence than the "no-contribution" rule.
Dean Wigmore once referred to the release rule as "a surviving relic of the
Cokian period of metaphysics."" The bases and reasons for the common
law rule are somewhat cloudy, but may be stated briefly thus: where the
tortious conduct of two or more persons combines to cause a single, indivisible injury to another, the injured party has only one cause of action and is
entitled to only 9ne satisfaction. Hence, a release of the cause of action
against one of the tortfeasors necessarily releases the others. 2
All authorities agree that the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction; however, the "one cause of action" idea seems to be without support among modern authorities. It is undisputed that tort liability is joint
and several, and, as a result, the injured party may bring separate actions
the entire injury. But
and recover judgment against each tortfeasor for
3
such injured party is limited to one satisfaction.1
"Nothing but false logic," says Wigmore, "prevents a complete repudiation" of the principle ". . . that mere words of release to A must inexorably signify also a release to B and C . .. 2"'

The "complete repudiation" which Wigmore urged, however, has been
long in coming in California. The rule has been a dangerous trap for unwary litigants and attorneys, and while the long-term trend of the California courts has been to avoid the rule, in many cases they have applied
it with ofttimes harsh and, perhaps, unjust results.
California's leading case on the point is Chetwood v. CaliforniaNational Bank. 5 In that case three directors of the bank were found to have
been negligent in their failure to exercise control over the operations of the
bank. The court appointed a referee to determine the sum due to the bank
from certain debtors, for whose debts the directors were to be held responsible. The referee found the sum due to be over $196,000. Before formal
judgment was entered the plaintiff settled with two of the defendants for
the sum of $2 7,500 and dismissed the action as to them. The court held that
this released all defendants from further liability, saying:
9

Id. at 218.

10 9 U.L.A. 153 (1939).

1117 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923).
12 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
13 20 CAL. JUR., Parties§ 20 (1925).
14 Supra note 11 at 564.
15 113 Cal. 414, 45 Pac. 704 (1896).

COMMENTS

Feb., 1958]

" ... Where several joint tort feasors have been sued in a single action, a
retraxit 16 of the cause of action in favor of one of them operates to release
them all. The reason is quite obvious. By his withdrawal plaintiff announces that he has received satisfaction for the injury complained of, and
it would be unjust that he should be allowed double payment for the single
wrong. It matters not, either, whether the payment made was in a large or
in a small amount .
"...,17

It appears that the court in the Chetwood case indulged in a bit of
question-begging. By stating that the plaintiff announced that he had received satisfaction the court assumed the answer to the question which
should have been controlling; that is, whether or not the plaintiff accepted
the $27,500 with the intention that it should be full satisfaction for the
injury. Instead of looking for manifestations of the plaintiff's intent the
court apparently raised a conclusive presumption that any amount paid for
a release is full satisfaction of the claim.
Dean Prosser suggests that much of the difficulty with the release rule
is caused by the courts' confusing the terms "satisfaction" and "release."
He defines satisfaction as "an acceptance of full compensation for the injury."' On the other hand, he says "... . a release is a surrender of the
cause of action, which may be gratuitous or given for inadequate consid-

eration....M,9

Of course, if the plaintiff had accepted the consideration for the release
as "full compensation for the injury" the other tortfeasors should have been
released. As noted, however, this should have been decided in the light of
the plaintiff's manifestations of intent, and not on the basis of any presumptions.
In Flynn v. Manson,' another California case, the court held that a
clause in a release which expressly reserved rights against the other tortfeasors was "void as being-repugnant to the legal effect and operation of
the release itself," and consequently held that the other tortfeasors were
released.
The common law courts developed an important exception to the release
rule, in the covenant not to sue. This differs in form from an outright release
in that the covenantor uses words of promise, agreeing not to prosecute a
suit, and to hold the covenantee harmless from any liability, claims or demands arising from the tort. Words of release are not used. Courts have
held that covenants not to sue do not release the other tortfeasors, 2 and
this became the principal mode used to circumvent the release rule.
Is "A retraxit (he hath withdrawn) differs from a non-suit, in that one is negative and the
other positive; the non-suit is a default and neglect of the plaintiff, and therefore he is allowed
to begin his suit again, upon payment of costs; but a retraxit is an open and voluntary renunciation of his suit, in court, and by this he forever loses his action." JoNEs, BLAcKSTONz § 374,
p. 1885 (1916).
17 113 Cal. 414, 426, 45 Pac. 704, 707.
Is Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAnir. L. RFV. 413, 423 (1937).
19 Ibid.
20 19 Cal. App. 400, 126 Pac. 181 (1912).
21 Kincheloe v. Retail Credit Co., 4 Cal. 2d 21, 46 P.2d 971 (1935).
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Whether a particular instrument should be construed to be a release or
a covenant not to sue, however, was held to be determined by manifestations of the intention of the parties, and not by the form of the instrument.'
Thus, the California courts placed themselves in a paradoxical position.
On one hand they searched thoroughly for an intention to execute a release or a covenant not to sue. On the other hand they ignored and gave no
effect to the obvious, and sometimes expressed, intention not to discharge
the other tortfeasors from liability.
In Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.' the California Supreme Court frankly
recognized that
"....

the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is entirely

artificial. As between the parties to the agreement, the final result is the
same in both cases, namely, that there is no further recovery from the defendant who makes the settlement, and the difference in the effect as to
third parties is based mainly, if not entirely, on the fact that in one case,
there is an immediate release, whereas in the other there is an agreement
not to prosecute a suit. . .."24

Fortunately, the California courts have recognized that the release rule
should not apply in cases where the tortfeasors are independent and successive, rather than joint, even though one of them may be liable for the entire
injury. In Ash v. Mortensen25 the plaintiff was injured in an accident caused
by the negligence of one Wubben. His injuries were aggravated by the negligence of the defendants, physicians to whom the plaintiff had gone for
treatment. Under the law both Wubben and the doctors would be liable
for the damages resulting from the injury caused by the doctors. 6 Plaintiff
first sued Wubben and recovered a judgment for $15,000. The aggravation
of his injuries by the doctors was not an element of the damages awarded.
Wubben paid the plaintiff $5,753.22 on the judgment, and the plaintiff had
the judgment satisfied of record and signed a document releasing Wubben
from further liability. Plaintiff then sued the doctors for the damages
caused by their negligence. The court noted that the release rule had been
applied in similar cases in a number of other jurisdictions, but criticised
the reasoning behind such application. The court refused to extend the release rule to such cases on the grounds that the plaintiff had separate causes
of action, and, hence, the "unity of a cause of action" argument was not
valid. This decision marks an important step in the previously mentioned
long-term trend in California to restrict the release rule.
The latest judicial step in this direction was made by the California
Supreme Court in the recent case of Lamoreux v. San Diego & Arizona
22

Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 268 Pac. 943 (1928).
26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
24d.at 711, 160 P.2d at 786.
25 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
26 Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 433, 229 Pac. 30, 33 (1924).
23

Feb., 1959]

COAMENTS

EasternRy. Co.- In that case the plaintiff's husband was killed in an accident at a grade crossing. Plaintiff first sued both the railroad and her husband's employer, alleging that they were jointly engaged in raising the
grade at the crossing and that their joint negligence caused her husband's
death. Plaintiff then settled with the employer for $3,500, a sum lesser than
the amount the Industrial Accident Commission could award under the
workmen's compensation provisions of the Labor Code. As part of the settlement plaintiff declared that she was satisfied that the evidence would not
support her allegation of negligence by the employer. The commission approved the settlement, and the plaintiff then filed a direction for dismissal
with prejudice of the action against the employer.
The court held that the dismissal with prejudice did not operate as a
release of the railroad, even though there have been several California
decisions holding that such a dismissal does constitute a release. 8 These
cases were distinguished on the ground that in the Lamoreux case the employer's liability, if any, was a special liability imposed under the workmen's compensation statutes, for which he was subject to proceedings before the Industrial Accident Commission but not to suit in court for the
injury. Thus, the compromise was not an acceptance of full compensation
for injuries arising from the employer's negligence.
The trend of the California courts in avoiding the release rule wherever
possible would probably have led eventually to a repudiation of the rule,
but the legislature has now made that step unnecessary.
Effect of the Newv Rules
Coming now to the statutes passed by the California legislature, an
attempt will be made to evaluate the new rules and to foretell the effects
they will have.
Acts of this type apparently have two general objectives: 1) the control of the distribution of loss by law, rather than by the plaintiff; and,
2) the encouraging of out-of-court settlements. The rule allowing contribution is aimed at accomplishing the first objective, and the release rule
is aimed at accomplishing the second.
There seem to be two main ideas behind the first objective. First, an
innate sense of fairness and equity dictates that where there are two or
more joint tortfeasors, each of whom has contributed to the injury, they
should share equally in discharging the common liability. One or more
should not be allowed to escape without having paid his fair share. Secondly, for reasons of public policy it does not appear desirable to allow the
2748 Cal. 2d 617, 311 P.2d 1 (1957).
28
Markwell v. Swift and Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 245, 272 P.2d 47 (1954); Leff v. Knewbow,
47 Cal. App.2d 360, 117 P.2d 922 (1941); Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105 Cal. App. 189, 287 Pac. 149
(1930).
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plaintiff to control the distribution of loss by whim, spite, or collusion with
the tortfeasors he fails to sue or levy execution against.29
The reason for the second objective, the encouraging of out-of-court
settlements, is to save the time, effort, and expense involved in litigation,
both for the parties and the community.
It was apparently with these objectives in mind that the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted its first Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1939.30 This act was adopted in eight jurisdictions,3 1 but was
extensively modified in most cases, so that there was no semblance of uniformity among states allowing contribution. The act was revised in 1955,
under the chairmanship of Dean Prosser. To date the revised act has been
adopted only in North Dakota.
The 1939 uniform act differed in at least four important areas from the
act passed by the 1957 California legislature. These differences are: (1)
The 1939 uniform act recognized a right of contribution before judgment, 2
while the right will not arise in California until a joint judgment has been
rendered.33 (2) The 1939 uniform act applied to all joint tortfeasors,3 4
while the California act allows contribution only among unintentional
wrongdoers.3 5 (3) Under the 1939 uniform act a release of one joint tortfeasor did not release him from liability to his co-tortfeasors for contribution,3 6 but in California a released tortfeasor will not be liable for contribution.3" (4) The 1939 uniform act contained provisions for third-party
practice so that the questions of contribution could be heard in the main
tort action, 38 but no such provisions were included in the California act.
The first difference is the most significant one, and the one which will
probably have the most force in limiting the effect of the California act.
Keeping in mind that the objective of a rule allowing contribution is to
control the distribution of loss by law, rather than leave such control with
the plaintiff, it appears that the California act falls short of the mark. Under
it a right of contribution will arise only after the plaintiff has sued two or
more joint tortfeasors and has recovered a joint judgment against them.
The plaintiff is still completely free to place the entire loss on fewer than
all of the tortfeasors, by simply faling to sue them all, either from whim,
29 For a defense of what are called the plaintiff's "tactical advantages," see James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 H~Av. L. Rav. 1156, 1160-65
(1941). And, on the general subject of contribution among tortfeasors, see the ensuing debate
with Professor Gregory; Gregory, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense; James,
Replication;
and Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 HIAv. L. Rav. 1156-89 (1941).
3
oSupra note 10.
31 HANDBOOK OF

216 (1955).
32

Tma

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAws

UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
33 CAL.CODE CIV. PROC. § 875(a).
34
UN17ORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
35 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 875(d).
3
6 UNaIFop CONTRIBUTION AMONG
37 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 877(b).
38 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG

TORTFEASORS ACT

§ 1 (1939).

ToaaTAsoRs ACT

§ 2 (1) (1939).

TORTrEASORs ACT

§5

(1939).

TORTFEASORs ACT

§7

(1939).
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spite, or collusion. Clearly this defect goes to the very heart of the purpose
of a contribution statute, and will probably negate most of the expected
beneficial results. Professor Gregory, who had much to do with the drafting
of the 1939 uniform act, asserts that the feature of restricting the right of
contribution to parties to a joint judgment "was responsible for the complete failure" of a similar New York statute. 9
The other three differences between the 1939 uniform act and the California statute were eliminated by revisions of the uniform act in 1955,40 but
in only one case can the California position be really justified. This is the
rule limiting the right of contribution to unintentional tortfeasors. Nearly
all commentators have been in favor of this limitation because the reason
behind the decision in Merryweather v. Nixan, i.e., courts should not adjudicate matters between two intentional wrongdoers still applies. In the 1955
revised act the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws changed their position so as to conform to this view,' which was also followed by the California legislature.
The area of difference as discussed in point (3) above presents a knottier problem. Having the contribution and release rules in their bare form,
it would appear desirable to provide that a release of one tortfeasor should
not release him from his liability for contribution unless the release is for
an amount equal to the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the joint liability, or
unless the consideration paid for the release is, in fact, equal to or in excess
of such pro rata share. This would tend to accomplish the first objective, in
that it would prevent a plaintiff from releasing one tortfeasor for a small
amount and then suing the others, who would not be able to extract contribution from the released tortfeasor if the pro rata shares exceeded the
amount the released tortfeasor paid. A provision to this effect was included
in the 1939 act,42 but experience under the act showed that this provision

had the effect of stifling out-of-court settlements.43 Plaintiffs were unwilling to release a tortfeasor for an amount equal to his pro rata share of the
joint liability, for the reason that they did not know what they were giving
up. The pro rata shares cannot be determined until a judgment is rendered.
If a plaintiff accepts $500 from one tortfeasor and releases him from all
liability to an amount equal to his pro rata share of the total liability, and
such pro rata share is later determined to be $5,000 the plaintiff has lost
$4,500, for any judgment he may recover will be reduced by an amount
equal to the released tortfeasor's pro rata share. 4 Tortfeasors were unwill39 Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice,Wis. L. REv. 365, 369

(1938).
40 HANBooOK or TnE NATIONAL CoN ERENCE OF COM2dISSIONERS ow UNVIFORM STATE LAWS

218 (1955).
41

UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AmONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1 (c)(1955).

42

Supra note 36.
43 See discussion of this effect in HANBoo
SIONERS ON UNIFORMs STATE LAWS 224 (1955).
44

UNIFOR

or Tm NATIONAL CoNFERENCzOF CondIs-

CONTRiBuT ON AMONG TOR=ASORS ACT

§ 5 (1939).
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ing to settle unless they were also released from liability for contribution.
As long as a tortfeasor was going to be held liable for his full pro rata share
he might as well defend the action. The incentive for out-of-court settlements was impaired, if not destroyed. Thus, a provision which was inserted
for the purpose of accomplishing the first objective had the actual effect of
defeating the second objective. Obviously, a balance had to be struck. A
sacrifice had to be made. The commissioners decided that the encouragement of out-of-court settlements was more important than the prevention
of discrimination by plaintiffs, and they revised the act accordingly.45
It is submitted that the reasons for this revision in the uniform act are
not valid in California under the section limiting contribution to parties to
a joint judgment. It is clear that any subsection to the general rule recognizing the right of contribution has no effect unless a joint money judgment
has been rendered. Thus, the rule of the 1939 uniform act that a release
does not also release the tortfeasor from liability for contribution, would
have no application in California until a joint judgment is rendered. As
shown, the criticism of this rule is that it stifles out-of-court settlements,
but would this criticism be valid in California? The only out-of-court settlements the rule could stifle are those entered into after judgment, when
the damage, as far as the time, effort, and expense of litigation is concerned,
has been done. Also, the new release rule does not extend to settlements
made after verdict or judgment, so it cannot be said that the legislature is
interested in encouraging such settlements. Thus, the rule that a release of
one tortfeasor also releases him from liability for contribution can serve no
useful purpose in California, and will only detract from the contribution
act as a whole. Of course, if the act were amended so as to provide for a
right of contribution before judgment then the section that has been discussed should be retained.
Where a right of contribution exists it seems desirable that third-party
practice should be allowed so that all issues could be heard in one trial.
This is particularly true where the right of contribution exists before judgment. For example, suppose that A and B, through their joint negligence,
injure C. For some reason or another, C sues only A, but does not release B.
If a judgment is rendered against A and A satisfies it, he is entitled to contribution from B under a statute such as the uniform act. But if B denies
he was negligent another trial must be held to determine B's liability. This
is wasteful of time, effort, and expense and is the reason behind the thirdparty practice provisions of the 1939 uniform act.46 The commissioners
omitted these provisions in the 1955 revised act, apparently not because
they were unsound, but because they were so complex that they tended to
confuse the parties, attorneys, and courts. The third-party practice was
45

UNIFORM CoNTRrBUTioN AMONG TORTFEASoRS

AcT § 4(b) (1955).

46 Supra note 38.
47 See Dean Prosser's report in the HANDBOOK OF THE NA7IONAL CoNFERENcE OF CoMSsiomnRs ON U rx 0P

STATE LAws 150 (1952).
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left to the established procedure in the several states,18 with the hope, no
doubt, that the states had satisfactory procedural rules in this respect.
Unfortunately, California does not have third-party practice rules for
cases involving joint tortfeasors, and no such provisions are included in the
statutes being discussed. At first glance, it might appear that effective thirdparty procedure rules might cure the defect imposed by the rule limiting
the right of contribution to joint tort judgment debtors. This is true where
the plaintiff is willing to amend his complaint. If C sued only A, A impleaded B, and C amended his complaint to name B as a joint defendant
all issues could be determined at one trial, and A would be entitled to contribution if he paid more than his pro rata share of the judgment liability.
However, this still leaves control in the hands of the plaintiff, and if he
refuses to amend his complaint A's right to contribution never arises. Thus,
third-party procedure would only partially cure the defect in the California
act, for there is no way to force a plaintiff to amend his complaint so as to
name a third-party who is impleaded by the defendant.49 The California
Law Revision Commission recommended adoption of a third-party procedure along the lines of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 9
but the legislature failed to act on this recommendation.
There is one other peculiar feature of the California act which must be
noted. This involves the right of a liability insurance carrier to subrogate
itself to the rights of contribution of its insureds. If A's liability insurance
carrier pays more than A's pro rata share of the common liability in discharge of its obligation to A it seems only logical that the insurance company should be subrogated to A's right to contribution from B. The 1955
uniform act so provides. 5 ' In California the matter is handled in Code of
Civil Procedure, section 875(e):
"A liability insurer who by payment has discharged the liability of a tortjeasor judgment debtor shall be subrogated to his right of contribution."
(Emphasis added.)
A strict reading of this section indicates that the insurer cannot subrogate
itself to its insured's right to contribution until it has discharged the entire
liability of its insured, even though the insured's right to contribution arises
when more than his pro rata share is paid. For example, assume that C
obtains a joint and several judgment for $6,000, against A and B. A has a
$5,000 liability insurance policy and the carrier pays the face amount in
satisfaction of its obligation to A. Under the section quoted it appears that
48

Commissioners' Comment, HAmBO0oror toNATIONAL

ON UNoRM STATE LAWS 222

49

CONFEnRNCE OF Co

ssIoNERs

(1955).

Delano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ; Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines,
Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
50

CAnLroRmA LAW PEVISION CO3=SSION, BRINGInG NEW PAR~s

M-20,
M-24 (1957). For Rule 14 see U.S.C.A. Title 28, 22, 539.
51
Ux Fom CONrmvUTioN AmONO Toiz=ArsoRs AcT § 1(e) (1955).
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the insurance carrier could not enforce A's right to contribution against B
because A's liability has not been fully discharged.
The courts may remedy this defect by giving section 875(e) a liberal
construction, on the grounds that by the words "the liability of a tortfeasor
judgment debtor" the legislature really meant "his pro rata share thereof."
Conclusion
There is certainly a need for change in the common law rules denying
contribution among tortfeasors and providing that a release of one joint
tortfeasor also releases the others. Cases show that these rules have resulted
in much confusion and injustice, and for this reason Title 11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is certainly a step in the right direction.
Whether or not it will settle all the difficulties caused by the old rules and
produce the desired results, of course, cannot be foretold with complete
accuracy. It is submitted, however, that there are at least four defects in
the present act which will detract from its total effect when viewed in the
light of the act's objectives.
The first, and most important defect, is the limitation of the rights of
contribution to tortfeasors against whom a joint judgment is rendered.
Until this defect is cured the chances appear slim that the act will accomplish its first objective; i.e., the control of the distribution of loss by law
rather than by the plaintiff. The second defect, the rule that a release also
releases the tortfeasor from liability for contribution, is a defect only if the
act remains in its present form. If the act is amended so that a right of
contribution exists before judgment then this rule should be retained in
order to encourage out-of-court settlements. The third defect, the absence
of an effective third-party practice procedure, is also of great importance
and must be remedied soon if the act is to prove practicable. It must be
noted, however, that the curing of this defect will not completely remedy
the first defect. The final drawback is the apparent limiting of an insurer's
right to subrogate itself to its insured's right to contribution to cases where
the insurer has discharged the entire liability of the insured, rather than
allowing such subrogation where the insurer has paid more than the insured's pro rata share of the total liability.
The second objective, i.e., the encouragement of out-of-court settlements, will probably be accomplished to some extent. However, this objective was not as pressing as the first since the results were obtainable before
by the use of the covenant not to sue. The statute changing the common
law release rule merely clears the air and removes the technical trap which
had plagued parties before.
Because of the defects pointed out, however, it is felt that the legislation as a whole lacks the teeth necessary to do the job required. An adoption of the 1955 revised uniform act would have made much more progress
toward solution of the problems presented by the common law rules.

